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At the beginning of the transition period, the public debt in Romania was 
insignificant. However, during the following years, the accumulating process 
accelerated. Although the indebtedness degree continues to be smaller than registered 
levels in other European countries, more dangerous could be its accelerating trend in 
conditions of some not so very high-performing macroeconomic policy management. 
The present study attempts to answer certain problems related to the governing 
mechanism of the public debt accumulation. Particularly, it examines: a) some 
significant implications of the public sector deficits on the dynamics of the main 
macroeconomic indicators; b) certain factors having impact on sustainability degree; 
and c) possibilities for setting up fundamental parameters and a time horizon to stop 
the debt accumulation process. Certain plausible hypotheses will be selected and 
some likely evolutions will be simulated. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
At the beginning of the transition period in 1990, the public debt in Romania 
was insignificant. During the following years, the accumulating process accelerated. 
By 1998, the domestic public debt, together with the country’s external debt, have 
already increased up to near 40% of Gross Domestic Product. Although the 
indebtedness degree of the country continues to be smaller than levels registered in 
other European countries, more dangerous is its accelerating trend in conditions of 
some not so very high-performing macroeconomic policy management. Especially, 
under the impact of authorities’ actions in order to join NATO and the European 
Union, of agreements with international financing institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the problems of public debt and 
budgetary deficits has become more and more sharp. The major difficulties proceed 
from the weak performance of the Romanian economy, doubled by the complex 
problems of the economic reform and restructuring, but also by a more and more 
restricted access to the external financing on international markets. 
 The present paper attempts to answer certain questions related to the 
governing mechanisms of the public debt accumulation. In particular, it examines: a) 
some of the most important implications of the public sector deficits on the dynamics 
of the main macroeconomic indicators; b) certain factors that impact on sustainability 
degree, and c) possibilities for setting up fundamental parameters and a time horizon 
to stop the debt accumulation process. Certain plausible hypotheses will be selected 
and some likely evolutions will be simulated. 
 
 
 
2. THE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC DEBT AFTER 1989 
 
 There are various approaches in the specialised literature regarding public 
debt and public sector. In most official publications referring to public debt, the 
public sector is considered as the “general government” or consolidated non-financial 
public sector, which consists of the central government, the local authorities and non-
private social welfare and other organisations (and this is the definition also used in 
our paper). Others add certain public corporations, while in many cases, some special 
credit institutions are also included in the definition. Similarly, certain publications 
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refer to gross debt, others to net debt (i.e. gross debt net of public sector liquid 
assets); while in some cases more assets are netted out. 
 The exclusion of the state financial institutions from the conventional 
definition of the public sector creates some problems. This is particularly the case in 
Romania where the State is the majority shareholder of most of the domestic 
commercial banks, while two special credit institutions belong entirely to it. Almost 
all the domestic liabilities of public corporations and most of the domestic liabilities 
of the central government itself are assets of the banks and credit institutions, 
partially or wholly owned by the State. This implies: a) that the size of the public 
debt may be very sensitive to the definition of the public sector, and b) that the 
seignorage revenue, which is defined as the change in the monetary base in real 
terms, may accrue to the public sector, as it is conventionally defined here, in an 
indirect and mot easily detectable way.    
 A particular criticism of the conventional definitions of public debts and 
deficits is the asymmetry in the treatment between the private and the public sectors 
in the presentation of their accounts. It is argued that instead of public debt, the 
concept of public net worth should be used, while the annual public deficits should 
be split between consumption and investment deficits (Eisner, 1989; Stournaras, 
1990). Although this criticism is correct, the data needed to evaluate public sector 
assets makes it an impossible task. However, the ratio between consumption and 
investment deficits has serious implications for the sustainability of an increasing 
public debt, the transfer of burden on future generations and the balance of resources 
in the economy. It also provides a proxy for the evolution of public sector’s net 
worth (Odling-Smee and Riley, 1985). Therefore, it should be a necessary 
component in any study of public debts and deficits. 
During the period after 1989, Romania faced more and more to public debt 
accumulation as a new matter of macroeconomic policy, in contrast to other Central 
and East-European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland. 
While the external debt of Romania was insignificantly in 1990 (US$230 million), 
the other Central and East-European countries were already confronted with debt 
amounts of many billions of USD (Hungary – US$21.3 billion, Bulgaria – US$10.9 
billion, the Czech Rep. – US$4.4 billion). In the case of Poland, the figure was close 
to US$50 billion. Eight years later, in 1998, the external debt of Romania had already 
increased up to more than 9 billion USD, while the other countries (with the 
exception of the Czech Republic, where external debt was five times larger than in 
1990) registered either a modest growth (e.g. the case of Hungary, with a growth of 
US$5.5 billion) or even a diminution (Poland, with more than US$6 billion, partially 
caused by cancellation of a proportion of its external debt, and in Bulgaria with close 
to one billion USD). One of the weakest performance of the Romanian economy 
after 1989 was the poor experience regarding the management of public debt and 
budget deficits. 
 The evolution of the external debt in Romania, as a share in GDP evaluated in 
US dollars and respectively in Lei, is shown in Figs 1 and 2. The statistical data on 
which graphs were based are presented in Appendix 1. 
 Contrary to the advanced countries, the external debt is in Romania the main 
component of the total debt. However, in later years one can see that accumulation of 
domestic public debt became a more important source to cover deficits. For instance, 
in 1998 it represented almost 8% of the GDP. This evolution is directly related to the 
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efforts meant to improve the management of domestic debt, especially by enacting a 
new rule in April 1997 regarding the development of a secondary market for state 
obligations, restricting access to the external sources of financing and taking over in 
public debt an important volume of non-efficient credits. For instance, the share of 
the state loans approved by special normative documents evolved as follows: in 1992 
– 8.1%; in the 1993-1996 period – an average level of 5.7% (with a maximum share 
of 11.7% in 1995); and in 1998-1999 – more than 30%, during an accelerating 
restructuring process of the banking system. 
 It is remarkable to see that Romania has also begun to demonstrate the 
correlation between election cycles and the accumulation of public debt. We can 
observe on the presented graphs the jumps occurred in the electoral years, in 1992 
and in 1996 respectively, followed by calm dept accumulation dynamics between the 
two elections moments. In the literature, there is a serious focus on evaluating the 
impact of the political environment’s dynamics on the public debt accumulation. 
Some authors even sought to quantify this impact (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). One of 
the most important conclusions of such studies is that there is a direct correlation 
between the degree of homogeneity of the power coalitions and the dynamics of the 
public sector deficits. As a proven rule, when the leading political coalition has a 
large number of parties with various political orientations, as it was the situation in 
Romania between 1996 and 2000, then the budget policy loses its coherence and the 
deficits will increase. On the contrary, in countries where the political power is in the 
hands of a single strong party, the chance to apply an efficient management of public 
debt is greater.  
 The evolution of the gap between the share of debt in GDP evaluated in 
dollars and that expressed in Lei, shown on the graph in Fig. 3, reflects the impact of 
domestic currency depreciation (the value of external debt being converted by 
Lei/USD exchange rate at the end of each year). Moreover, the evolution during the 
1990-1998 period in Romania demonstrates a strong reverse correlation between the 
change of the rate of the real GDP and the dynamics of the mentioned gap (see Fig. 
4).          
 Another important aspect of the analyses regarding the evolution of public 
debt is represented by the distinction among the main institutional sectors. In 
Romania, as we have already mentioned, beside the conventional public debt owned 
by the so-called general government there is a part which corresponds to public 
corporations and special credit institutions. Figs. 5 and 6 present the evolution of the 
the three constitutive components of gross public debt, evaluated in dollars and 
respectively in Lei, computed with the exchange rate base registered at the end of 
each year. 
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 The first line at the bottom of the graphs represents the dynamics of 
governmental debt, the second line traces the evolution of the gross public debt, and 
the third one, at the top of the graphs, expresses the evolution of the country’s gross 
debt. The difference between the middle and first curve could be interpreted as gross 
public corporation debt, but the gap between the curve placed on the top and middle 
of the graphs represents the share of the non-public sector. Moreover, during the 
considered period, one can see an amplification trend of the two gaps, which 
indicates a decrease in the share of the government-debt both in the gross public 
sector debt and in the gross county debt. 
 Despite Romania’s classification by Word Bank in international statistics as 
“less indebted” country, together with Poland, Croatia, the Slovak Republic, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, etc. (while Hungary is classified as “moderately indebted” 
and Bulgaria as “severely indebted”), some alarming signals were emitted by certain 
external financing institutions in the last years. With a background of continuing 
economic recession for consecutive three years, and a rapid external debt-service 
burden, certain international agencies specialised in country risk evaluation lowered 
Romania’s score. One of the most important arguments was exactly the worsening of 
the sustainability indicators, in correlation with other negative occurrences, such as 
diminishing accumulation resources, decreasing domestic savings and investment 
rates, and increasing the risk for foreign investments, etc. [1]. The fact that more than 
90% of the country’s gross debt is external financed demonstrates the fragility of the 
national economy, and the high degree to which it depends on the external financing 
conditions for collecting new resources. In such circumstances, the sustainability 
problem, already intensively preoccupying Romania’s external financing institutions, 
should have to give seriously incentives to those having an impact on 
macroeconomic policy decisions, especially to the government.           
 
 
 
3. AN ESTIMATION OF THE PARAMETERS IN AN EQUATION OF 
PUBLIC DEBT DYNAMICS 
 
 Quantifying the dynamics of the public sector debt often starts from the well-
known definition of the government’s budget constraint. The change in the public 
sector debt D between two time periods  (years) t and t –1, is given by the following 
equality:  
  
D t  –  D t – 1  =  i t D t – 1  +  Π t  +  a t D t – 1  –  ∆B t   (1) 
 
where i is the average nominal interest rate on public sector debt, Π is the primary 
deficit (PSBR net of interest payments), a is the revaluation effect on existing debt 
(in Romania this is entirely due to the depreciation of the effective exchange rate of 
the Leu, since public debt is not sold, at least up to now, below or above its 
redemption value) and ∆B is the direct financing of the budget from the Central Bank 
[2].  
 Certain methodological remarks are due here. According to the Treasury’s 
definition, the central government debt includes, among other liabilities, long-term 
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loans made available to the government by the National Bank of Romania as well as 
treasury bills sold to the latter. These long-term loans and treasury bills create debt 
service obligations for the central government. The implication is that ∆B in equation 
(1) is not the change in the monetary base, ∆M, but part of it, determined by changes 
in a special government account with the Bank. Another related point is the 
allocation of seignorage revenue. Although the NBR does not pay dividends to the 
Treasury, it subsidises the activities of various commercial banks and special credit 
institutions partly or wholly owned by the State, whose assets and liabilities are not 
included in the definition of public debt.   
 The direct financing of the budget from the NBR is the change, ∆B, in the 
outstanding balance of the government account with the Bank. When these accounts 
show a negative balance, this cannot exceed a certain limit set by the law. It is this 
(constrained) change in the balance of this account that constitutes direct financing of 
the PSBR by the NBR and is not considered by the Treasury as additional debt. It 
should be noted that the effective limit constraining the direct financing is lower than 
the one set by the law, because a (small) interest rate is charged on negative balances.  
 Finally, due to non-accurate primary statistical data, we used D, the public-
sector gross debt (excluding government guaranteed debt), in order to evaluate the 
dynamics of the public sector debt, and obtained ∆B as the difference between the 
sum of the first three components of equation (1) and ∆D. Then, dividing both sides 
of equation (1) by the nominal GDP, Yt , and manipulating we obtained: 
 
d t  –  d t – 1  =  ( i t  +  a t  –  g t )  [ d t – 1 / ( 1  +  g t ) ]  +  π t  –  b t  (2) 
 
where dt and dt–1 are the public sector debt to GDP ratio in two consecutive years, t 
and t –1, π is the primary public sector deficit as a percent of GDP, g is the nominal 
GDP growth rate between years t and t -1 and b is ∆B/Y. Alternatively we can 
approximate the nominal growth rate g as the sum of the change in the GDP deflator 
p and the real GDP growth rate q and rewrite equation (2) as: 
 
d t  –  d t – 1  =  ( i* t  –  q t)  [ d t – 1 / ( 1  +  g t ) ]  +  π t  –  b t  (3) 
 
where i* is defined as the real effective average interest rate on public sector debt – it 
is equal to the average real interest rate, i-p, plus the revaluation effect, a. Because of 
the specific situation in Romania in this period, we considered the following two 
cases: 1) – including general government proceeds from privatisation and 2) – 
excluding them. Privatisation income contributed to the amelioration of the 
government budget for the considered period. However, viewing the dynamic 
equation of public debt in the long run, it would be excluded. 
 Applying equation (3) to explain the evolution of central government debt 
relative to GDP (for which data on interest payments is more reliable in comparison 
to that regarding the general government or total public sector debt), we obtain Table 
1. The following conclusions can be drawn: 
 a) equation (3) predicts an acceptable evolution of the central government 
debt to GDP ratio for the whole period 1989-1998 (see the sum of the discrepancies 
and their average in column 5), but much better for sub-periods, although the year to 
year discrepancies appear to be significant for a number of years. This is mainly due 
to changing accounting practices regarding the treatment of capitalised interest 
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payments on central government debt sold to NBR, and to the use of the trade 
weighted – rather than debt weighted – effective exchange rate to estimate the 
revaluation effects owing to the depreciation of the Leu; 
b) the main cause of the increase in the debt to GDP ratio is the aggregate 
represented by column 5, which includes the impact of the real effective average 
interest rate on public sector debt (i*) in correlation with real GDP growth rate (q) 
and inflation rate, by agency of nominal GDP growth rate (g). For a number of years, 
the main cause is the primary deficit to GDP ratios; 
c) exclusion of income from privatisation produces a major impact both on 
primary deficit side (π) and on the direct financing from Central Bank (b). This must 
be an important signal for authorities at the moment when the privatisation process is 
finished; 
d) after 1994, the dimension of parameter b became comparable with the 
average change in the monetary base relative to GDP (column 10). 
 
 
 
Table 1 
The Evolution of the Central Government Debt to GDP Ratio (percentage points) 
 
  
dt - dt-1 
 
 
π t
 
(i*t - g*t) dt-1 
1 + gt
 
b t
 
Discrepancy 
(2)+(3)-(4)-(1) 
 
i - p 
 
a t
 
i*t
 
q t
 
∆Μ t 
Y t 
 
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
1990 0.7 -1.0 0.5 -1.2 0.00 -13.6 301.3 287.7 -5.6 … 
1991 7.9 -3.3 6.6 -4.5 -0.09 -186.1 2047 1861 -12.9 … 
1992 10.2 4.4 5.5 0.3 -0.57 -184.4 347.6 163.1 -8.8 … 
1993      1) 
    2) 
-1.8 
-1.4 
-0.6 
-0.2 
-0.9 
-0.7 
0.1 
0.3 
+0.19 
+0.19 
-207.4 192.4 
196.9 
-15.0 
-10.5 
1.5 3.4 
1994     1) 
    2) 
-4.1 
-3.8 
0.5 
1.2 
-4.5 
-4.6 
-0.3 
0.1 
+0.38 
+0.38 
-114.4 52.7 
53.9 
-61.7 
-60.4 
3.9 3.9 
1995     1) 
    2) 
1.9 
2.4 
1.2 
2.4 
2.5 
2.7 
1.6 
2.5 
+0.23 
+0.24 
-17.5 52.1 
53.6 
34.6 
36.1 
7.1 2.0 
1996     1) 
    2) 
6.1 
6.5 
2.2 
3.8 
4.7 
5.1 
0.6 
2.1 
+0.18 
+0.19 
-25.3 76.6 
76.5 
51.3 
51.2 
3.9 2.9 
1997     1) 
    2) 
0.4 
-0.2 
0.1 
1.1 
1.5 
1.3 
2.1 
3.6 
-0.93 
-1.00 
-107.2 116.5 
113.2 
9.3 
6.0 
-6.9 1.1 
1998     1) 
    2) 
2.1 
3.4 
-2.1 
0.2 
4.7 
5.2 
1.0 
2.6 
-0.54 
-0.56 
-17.5 39.6 
41.6 
22.1 
24.1 
-7.3 2.5 
Total           1) 
1989-98      2) 
23.3 
25.7 
1.4 
8.5 
20.5 
21.7 
-0.3 
5.8 
-1.1 
-1.2 
     
Average       1) 
1990-98       2) 
2.6 
2.9 
0.2 
0.9 
2.3 
2.4 
0.0 
0.6 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-97.0 
-97.0 
358.4 
359.1 
261.4 
262.0 
-2.8 
-2.8 
2.6 3)
Average       1) 
1990-92       2) 
6.3 
6.3 
0.0 
0.0 
4.2 
4.2 
-1.8 
-1.8 
-0.2 
-0.2 
-128.0 
-128.0 
898.7 
898.7 
770.7 
770.7 
-9.1 
-9.1 
… 
Average       1) 
1993-96       2) 
0.5 
0.9 
0.8 
1.8 
0.4 
0.6 
0.5 
1.3 
0.2 
0.3 
-91.1 
-91.1 
93.4 
95.2 
2.3 
4.1 
4.1 
4.1 
3.1 
Average       1) 
1997-98       2) 
1.2 
1.6 
-1.0 
0.7 
3.1 
3.2 
1.6 
3.1 
-0.7 
-0.8 
-62.4 
-62.4 
78.1 
77.4 
15.7 
15.0 
-7.1 
-7.1 
1.8 
1) including general government proceeds from privatisation 
2) excluding general government proceeds from privatisation 
3) 1993-98 
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4. IMPACT OF THE FISCAL POSITION ON DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Another important determinant of the debt dynamics that appears in equation 
(1) is primary fiscal balance. A permanent increase in the fiscal primary surplus, 
would improve debt sustainability through: (i) reduce the real interest rate by 
crowding out reduction; (ii) increase income by increasing efficiencies in resource 
allocation and reduced interest rates; (iii) and increasing the demand for the money 
base as a result of reduced inflationary expectations (Garcia, 1998).  Generally, large 
primary deficits are the story behind the accumulation of public debts and are in 
direct correlation with the development of conventional deficits. 
Analysis of both financial position and public debt composition during 1990-
99 is the first step towards finding an answer to the question whether fiscal policy 
can strike a balance by fending off debt accumulation, and the extent to which the 
current debt can be curtailed through the achievement of a surplus in the future. 
Conventional deficits of the central government were kept under control between 
1990-98; Romania’s performance in this area is better than that of Hungary or 
Bulgaria but worse than that of the Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovakia or Poland (as 
set out in the table of Appendix 2). 
Moreover, conventional deficits of the non-financial consolidated public 
sector posted large swings on an annual basis – ranging from 0.4% to 4.6% of GDP – 
which may be regarded as moderate. Behind these developments stood the reform of 
the fiscal system that was aimed at alleviating imbalances. Its influence on the 
volume and composition of incomes and expenditures is highlighted by data in Table 
2 (the yearly data are also presented in Appendix 3).  
Figures show that, once primary adjustment has taken place, the imbalance 
can take on a life of its own due to large outstanding debts and high interest 
payments. In addition, an average decrease in tax revenue by 4.8 percentage point 
from 1990-1991 to 1997-1999 led to higher expenditures because government tried 
to cover generous social support programmes that replaced high proportions of lost 
earnings. The exclusion of more and more people from labour force generated by the 
restructuring process (unemployment rate increased to 11.3 in July 1999) means that 
fewer workers are supporting a growing number of unemployed and retirees through 
higher tax burdens. In 1998, the social welfare deficit balance increased to 0.9% of 
GDP. Because the change in the tax revenue and in government expenditure had 
different effects on the debt sustainability, the composition of fiscal adjustment is a 
critical variable. 
During the transition period, the composition of incomes was affected by the 
following measures: abolishment of the previous confiscated profit transfer tax in 
1990 and its replacement with a profit tax, which was reformed in 1991 and again in 
August 1994 (currently, the rate is 38 percent); replacement of the inefficient 
turnover tax with VAT in July 1993, initially with a single rate of 18 percent, 
followed by introduction of a minimum level of 9 percent in 1994 for certain food 
items and medicines, and its readjustment in February 1998 by increasing this level 
from 9 to 11%, and from 18 to 22%, replaced in 1999 by a unique level of 18%; 
replacement of the former wage tax based on the economy-wide gross average wage 
with an individual wage tax; broadening of the tax base by substantially reducing the 
number of exemptions; delay in enforcement during 1999 of some regulations on the 
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luncheon vouchers and of the tax incentives to strategic investors. Tax reforms, 
which have started in 1998, changed the structure of the taxes, the indirect taxes 
becoming majoritary. The top priority for the year 2000 will be to enforce the 
personal income tax that will encompass all sources of personal income. 
On the expenditures’ side, in the first years of transition a few major 
decisions were taken to formulate a public expenditure strategy. They included the 
increased routing of expenditures through newly-established extra-budgetary funds 
and accounts; improved transparency and accountability since 1993, when these 
special extra-budgetary funds were incorporated into the annual Budget Law; 
establishment of the Treasury Directorate and of a Public-Debt Directorate; control 
over expenditures in 1993-95 by freezing or approving some of them depending on 
the resources available, save expenditures on wages and salaries, pensions, benefits, 
welfare payments; the sharp cut in subsidies and transfers and their transparent 
incorporation into the government budget. 
Therefore, during 1990-98, the revenues and expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP fluctuated within a margin of as much as 32% to 42%. The composition of 
expenditures shows the swift pace of self-sustaining public debt through ever-
increasing costs incurred by public debt service, reaching 6.25% share-to-GDP ratio 
in the first half of 1999 from 0.2% in 1992. Transparent subsidies granted from the 
government budget to state-owned enterprises undergoing restructuring, and with the 
abolition of the window for financing the quasi-fiscal deficit through direct credits 
and interest-rate subsidies in 1992 to 1996, enabled the policy-makers to assess the 
real size of the economic imbalances and to implement several corrective measures. 
Changing the structure of budget expenditures and revenues in Romania in 
the last years followed the new priorities of fiscal policy in the EU countries. The 
purpose of tax system reforms has mainly been to broaden the tax base, while at the 
same time lowering the marginal tax rates. The reforms concerning the expenditure 
side have consisted mostly of reducing the share of subsidies and transfer payments 
(Kosterna, 1997). The consolidated non-financial public sector deficits do not always 
show the whole picture because leave out quasi-fiscal operations that subsidise 
activities in the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12
 
Table 2 
Change in the Consolidated General Government Balance 
 
 Average Average Change Average Change Average 
 1990-1991 1992-1996  1997-1999  1990-1998
TOTAL REVENUE 40.8 33.1 -7.8 36.0 2.9 34.7 
   Current  39.2 32.8 -6.4 33.8 1.0 33.8 
     A. Tax 34.3 29.7 -4.6 31.8 2.1 30.6 
      A1. Direct tax 23.2 20.9 -2.3 19.6 -1.3 20.6 
         Profit tax 6.1 4.0 -2.0 3.8 -0.2 4.4 
       Tax on salaries 7.2 6.6 -0.5 6.0 -0.7 6.5 
       Social welfare  8.9 8.6 -0.3 8.8 0.2 8.5 
       contributions       
    Other 1.0 1.6 0.6 1.0 -0.6 1.2 
      A2. Indirect tax 11.2 8.9 -2.3 12.3 3.4 10.0 
             out of which:       
        Excises and oil tax 10.0 3.0 -7.0 2.5 -0.5 4.4 
        VAT 0.0 3.7 3.7 6.2 2.5 3.3 
       Customs tax 0.6 1.4 0.7 1.6 0.3 1.2 
        Other 0.5 0.9 0.4 1.9 1.1 1.1 
     B. Nontax 4.8 3.1 -1.8 2.0 -1.1 3.3 
   Capital 1.6 0.3 -1.4 2.1 1.8 0.9 
  Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
TOTAL 
EXPENDITURES 
38.7 35.7 -3.0 39.5 3.8 36.5 
  Current 31.8 30.2 -1.5 35.3 5.1 30.9 
      Goods and services, 
out of which: 
12.9 12.6 -0.4 13.3 0.7 12.5 
      Wages and salaries 7.4 6.7 -0.7 5.8 -0.9 6.5 
      Interest payments for 
public debt 
0.0 1.1 1.1 5.0 3.9 1.6 
    Subsidies and transfers 20.7 18.8 -1.9 16.8 -2.0 18.4 
     Subsidies 10.0 8.7 -1.3 2.4 -6.3 7.5 
     Transfers 10.7 10.1 -0.6 14.4 4.3 10.9 
     Capital 6.9 4.9 -2.1 3.7 -1.2 5.2 
   Lending minus 
repayments 
0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.4 
 OVERALL BALANCE 
(cash-net of privatisation 
2.1 -3.4 -5.6 -5.5 -2.1 -2.6 
receipts)       
OVERALL BALANCE  
(cash- including 
privatisation 
2.1 -2.7 -4.8 -3.5 -0.9 -1.8 
receipts)       
 PRIMARY Balance 
(including private) 
2.2 -1.5 -3.7 1.6 3.1 -0.2 
 PRIMARY Balance 
(excluding private) 
2.2 -2.3 -4.5 -0.4 2.0 -0.9 
 
The quasi-fiscal deficit was higher than the conventional one, ranging 
between 8.2% in 1992 and 1.6% in 1993, and was chiefly financed through money 
creation (Croitoru, 1995). During 1991 to 1994, the government was a net creditor of 
the financial sector, thus spurring both external financing of the public-sector deficit 
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and the external debt. On the other hand, 1996 saw an all-time high of the quasi-
fiscal deficit, which widened to 6.5% on a cash basis and to 8.4% on an accrual basis 
(OECD Economic Survey, 1998). 
There are also several options for measuring the deficit. The nominal cash 
approach which permits international comparisons of deficits across countries. 
Accrual–based deficits open the door to a whole set of unconventional measures 
based on the consideration of public net worth or intertemporal budget constraints, 
and are already used frequently in the specialised literature on debt sustainability. 
Statistical data on government’s operations generally have a track record of 
payments so that the fiscal position is usually assessed on a cash basis. This system 
has the advantage of an easier assessment of the impact of governmental operations 
on the monetary aggregates, but its main drawback is that it distorts the 
government’s commitments related to use of financial resources. Calculations based 
on the two methods (accrual and cash) reveal that payments have been deferred since 
1995, when the difference between the two assessment methods amounted to 0.4% of 
GDP. One year later, the figure edged up to a 1.9% share-to-GDP, highlighting the 
government’s default as a result of the election and thereby providing an overall view 
of the volume of arrears. Total conventional deficit of the consolidated non-financial 
public sector reached only 3.9% of GDP on a cash basis at the end of the fiscal year, 
by carrying forward into 1997 some expenditures with the “thirteenth month“ salary 
of public workers and some subsidies for farmers. 
We can conclude that the fiscal variable can define not only the speed of 
transition, but can also help assess the sustainability of government deficit. Fast 
reformers imposed severe budget constraints, measured as a reduction in subsidies 
and direct taxation, while compensating the losers of adjustment through higher 
social expenditure. 
 
 
 
5. ESTIMATION OF SEIGNIORAGE REVENUE CONTRIBUTION  
AND ITS LIMITS 
 
In the first part of the paper, the problem of income from seignorage to cover 
a part of government’s budget was eluded, and implicitly included in equations (1) 
through (3). In this part, we tray to present some possibilities for estimating the 
seignorage revenue. 
The evolution of the current deficits in the transition period casts doubt on the 
seignorage’s macroeconomic sustainability, allowing for the following possible 
options: (i) accommodation of expenditures with revenues; (ii) raising tax revenue 
from the public (iii) maintenance of the deficit and financing through money 
creation; and (iv) maintenance of the deficit and financing by means of borrowing 
from the domestic or foreign markets [3]. 
Deficit financing through money creation actually translates into financing 
through seignorage–for households, this means that the real value of money will 
down because of inflation. When it comes to assessing the change of the monetary 
base in real terms, the volume of seignorage that may be raised by the government 
from the households is conditional on the demand for money. This decreases against 
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the background of a high inflation rate, thereby containing the capacity for financing 
the deficit.  
The revenue raised through the printing of money is called seignorage 
(Lienert et.all, 1997). Formally, seignorage (S)  is given by:  
 
S = ∆Mt / P      (4) 
 
or 
 
   S = µ m      (5) 
 
where  µ = ∆Mt / Mt  (the percentage growth in the nominal money stock). 
Thus, seignorage is defined as the change in the nominal money balance held 
by the public (∆Mt) expressed in terms of price level (P) or, equivalently, the 
percentage growth rate of nominal money stock (µ) times the real money stock: m = 
M / P. To have a meaningful quantitative assessment of seignorage, such an amount, 
St, is usually measured in terms of GDP. So, St is defined as: 
 
St = ∆Mt / GDPt                   (6) 
 
where GDTt is nominal GDP. 
Seigniorage received by the government, Sg, will be much smaller and will 
only reflect the government issuance of reserve money or high-powered money (H): 
 
   Sg = ∆H / P                            (7) 
 
or  
 
 Sg = β ( H / P )                   (8) 
 
where β = ∆H / H, that is percentage growth in reserve money. 
Seignorage, Sg, can be decomposed into a “pure seignorage” component (h), 
that is desired by the public and an “inflation tax” component (π h), which, from the 
point of view of the public, is reduction of the real value of money due to inflation, 
given by: 
 
  Sg =  h + π h                           (9) 
 
where h = H / P. The equivalent formula for expression (7)  above is: 
 
Sgt  =  ∆ht + ∆Pt / Pt*ht-1                    (10) 
 
The expression (10) is also used in the measurement of nominal and real 
fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits as net seignorage collected by the Central Bank – 
equal to seignorage (Sgt) less the interest paid on commercial bank reserves (Rocha 
and Saldanha, 1992). Croitoru (1995) measuring the fiscal and quasifiscal deficit in 
Romania during 1990-1995, used expression (10) but changed it as: 
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          ∆H / P  =  ∆h + ( π / 1+π ) h-1                        (11) 
 
Because Romania is characterised by a high inflation rate, we used 
expression (10) in our work based on the monthly change in reserve money and a 
correction coefficient for inflation. The result for seignorage for the 1990-1994 
period were similar with the figures obtained by Croitoru and they are presented in 
Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3 
Seignorage and Inflation Tax in Romania 
 
Indicators 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
H1 
Inflation rate (change 
Dec./Dec.) 
199.2 295.5 61.7 27.8 56.9 151.4 40.6 
 
30.8 
Gross Seignorage (% of 
GDP) 
        
In nominal terms 7.7 8.2 4.3 3.4 1.8 4.9 1.3 10.3 
In real terms 6.9 6.8 4.0 3.1 1.4 4.1 1.1 3.0 
Gross Pure Seignorage  
(% of GDP) 
 
-3.4 
 
-2.4 
 
1.0 
 
1.5 
 
-1.6 
 
-0.4 
 
-1.0 
 
-1.6 
Inflation Tax  
(% of GDP) 
 
10.3 
 
9.2 
 
3.0 
 
1.7 
 
3.0 
 
4.5 
 
2.1 
 
4.6 
Broad Money (% of GDP) 30.8 22.3 21.4 25.3 27.9 24.8 27.3 21.7 
GDP (bill. lei) 6029.2 2035.7 49773.2 72135.5 108919.6 250480.2 338670 474830
 
 
 
The presented data reveal that the government of Romania obtained a larger 
volume of seignorage for financing the deficit in the first years of transition to a 
market-oriented economy. The level of seignorage was much higher in the years with 
three-digit inflation rate, i.e. in 1992, 1993, and 1997. The sharp decline in 
seignorage in recent years [4] helped to circumscribe this indicator to the limits close 
to those recorded usually by the market economies, i.e. 1-1.5% (Coricelli, 1997). It 
should be pointed out that enforcement of Law No.101/1998 regarding independence 
of the Central Bank stipulates the price stability as the main goal of the latter. This 
had a sensible impact on containing the government’s access to financing through 
seignorage. The upturn developed by this indicator in the first half of 1999 is 
undoubtedly linked to the pressing liquidity needs revealed by the banks undergoing 
restructuring (BANCOREX and Banca Agricola) and to the efforts made by the 
Central Bank to pre-empt a systemic crisis. The subsequent take-over to the public 
debt by issuing zero coupon bonds in the amount of ROL 6,617 billion and 
approximately USD 246 million helped to finance the deficit.  
Additionally, during the tightening monetary policy the seignorage drooped 
off as a result of the lower economic growth that decelerated expansion of reserve 
money. That, in turn, means that a larger portion of the deficit must be financed by 
increased debt. The smaller the deficit that needs to be financed by debt, the more the 
monetary authorities are on the upward sloping portion of the Laffer curve and 
accept inflation. The question is who determines how large the seignorage must be. 
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In the Sargent-Wallace story, the issue is that the Central Bank must choose between 
fighting present inflation with “tight” monetary policy now or fighting future 
inflation with “easy” monetary policy now. (Dornbusch, 1996). In fact, that translates 
into a need for the co-ordination monetary policy with fiscal authority. 
The drop in incomes from seignorage and inflation taxes points to the high 
level of demonetisations affecting the Romanian economy over the past few years. 
The slow process of re-monetisation and financial deepening in Romania lagged far 
behind those recorded by Poland, Slovak Republic, and Hungary. This leads us to the 
conclusion that the 3% deficit-to-GDP ratio laid down as a convergence criterion for 
integration with the European Union may prove inappropriate as the permissible 
level to maintain, as the monetary security appears to be much lower (Kosterna, 
1997). Both households and companies grapple with rampant inflation after being 
freed from the illusion of money, so that the governments find themselves in the 
position of resorting to alternative financing sources, such as debt increases. 
However, as long as inflation sticks to moderate levels, resorting to the inflation tax 
should prevail over the debt increases. Dornbusch and Fisher claim that, in general, 
the cost of swiftly curbing inflation down to moderate levels (e.g. 20%) may exceed 
the benefits, particularly in such circumstances as financial instability (Coricelli, 
1997, p. 46). 
 
 
 
6. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND 
EXTERNAL DEFICITS 
 
 The impact of the public sector deficits on the balance of resources in a 
national economy is a central theme in the macroeconomic policy. Macroeconomic 
theory offers a rich menu of linkages between public sector deficits and the rest of 
the economy. As far as the linkages between the public sector and external deficits 
are concerned, we will only refer to two theories, which can be considered as being 
at the two opposite extremes, noting that intermediate, and rather more plausible, 
views may be considered as combinations of these two extremes. The purpose of this 
exercise is to examine whether the Romanian experience justifies either of them, and 
hence derive some clues for the future. 
 The first case goes back to Ricardo and has been revived recently by Barro 
(1988). According to this viewpoint, the changes in budget deficits cause offsetting 
the changes in private saving through anticipations of changes in future taxation. 
Therefore, they have no effect on national savings and, consequently, on the current 
external account. The second “extreme” view is the one related to the New 
Cambridge Group (Fetherston and Godley, 1978) and is derived from the UK 
empirical evidence. According to it, the private sector’s (household and corporate 
sector) net acquisition of financial assets is zero. That is, the private disposable 
income is equal to the private consumption and investment expenditure. Therefore, 
the national income identity implies that a government budget deficit must be 
matched by an equal current account deficit (and a change in the government budget 
deficit by an equal change in the current account deficit). This view is also consistent 
with the Mundell-Fleming model under perfect capital mobility and a floating 
exchange rate. 
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 We present in Appendix 4 the relevant evidence for Romania regarding the 
evolution of the general government financial balance, the current account balance, 
private savings, investment, etc., all relative to GDP and on a national accounts basis. 
Dividing the whole period 1990-1998 in three equal periods, that can be 
characterised as being relatively homogeneously, and taking the average ratios for 
the three periods, we obtained the tables 4a and 4b, which are different versions of 
the same identity. 
 
 
Table 4a 
The National Income Identity (I)  
 
 GGFS 
 
PS PI CAS Discrepancy 
(1)+(2)-(3)-(4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1990-1998 
average, % of GDP 
 
-1.44 
 
16.69 
 
20.74 
 
-5.82 
 
0.32 
1990-1992 
average, % of GDP 
 
0.87 
 
17.27 
 
23.90 
 
-6.73 
 
0.97 
1993-1995 
average, % of GDP 
 
-1.63 
 
19.00 
 
21.00 
 
-3.63 
 
0.00 
1996-1998 
average, % of GDP 
 
-3.57 
 
13.80 
 
17.33 
 
-7.10 
 
0.00 
1993-95 / 1990-92 
changes between averages, % of GDP 
 
-2.50 
 
1.73 
 
-2.90 
 
3.10 
 
-0.97 
1996-98 / 1993-95 
changes between averages, % of GDP 
 
-1.94 
 
-5.20 
 
-3.67 
 
-3.47 
 
0.00 
 
 
Table 4a is based on a version of the national income identity, expressed by 
equation (12), which presents separately the general government financial surplus 
separately from the private savings (PS) and private investment (PI). GGFS includes 
the current and investment expenditures in the expenditure side. Such a presentation 
is helpful if the objective is to separate the budget deficit from the private sector’s 
saving-investment gap: 
 
GGFS  +  PS  –  PI  =  CAS,               (12) 
 
where CAS is the current account surplus on a national accounts basis (“net 
lending”). On the other hand, Table 4b is based on another version of the same 
identity: 
 
NS  –  NI  =  CAS              (13) 
 
which presents the CAS as the difference between the national gross savings (NS) 
and investment (NI). 
Despite the considered period being very short, we attempted to extract some 
conclusions. Data in Table 2a showed that although the average general government 
financial deficit (GGFS) has increased by 2.5 points and about 2 points between two 
consecutive three-year periods, the current account deficit (CAS) has changed in two 
different ways: in a contrary sense during 1993-95 and in the same sense during 
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1996-98. This implies that for the first period it seems that the “New Cambridge” 
hypothesis was in contrast to the Romanian experience, but for the next period 
(1996-98) it appeared to be more realistic.  
On the other hand, the resulting data from Tables 4 showed that the average 
private saving ratio (PS) has increased little between the first two periods (1995-
92/1992-90), but it was accompanied by a compensatory increase in government 
dissaving, implying a quasi-stagnation of the national gross saving ratio (+0.6 
points). Between the last two considered periods (1996-98/1993-95) there was a 
general crisis in savings and investment, with both sectors registering significant 
decreases. However, the government savings fell more than the private savings. 
While the current account deficit has changed significantly (+3.1 points between the 
two first periods and about –3.5 points between the last two periods), the numbers do 
not agree with the neo-Ricardian conclusions. The transmission mechanism is also in 
contrast to the one underlying the neo-Ricardian theory. For instance, considering the 
changes between the two periods, in Romania it was private investment (PI), rather 
than private savings (PS) that adjusted to the government dissaving. As it is evident 
from Table 4a, the fall in private investment was almost three percentage points of 
GDP, while the increase in private savings was less than two points. In fact, the 
change in private savings was smaller and in investment larger. Nonetheless, there 
was quite a different situation between the last two periods, with negative changes 
both in private saving and private investment. 
 
 
Table 4b 
The National Income Identity (II) 
 
 NS 
 
NI CAS Discrepancy 
(1)-(2)-(3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1990-1998 
average, % of GDP 
 
19.62 
 
25.89 
 
-5.82 
 
-0.44 
1990-1992 
average, % of GDP 
 
22.17 
 
29.87 
 
-6.73 
 
-0.97 
1993-1995 
average, % of GDP 
 
22.77 
 
26.00 
 
-3.63 
 
0.40 
1996-1998 
average, % of GDP 
 
13.93 
 
21.80 
 
-7.10 
 
-0.77 
1993-95 / 1990-92 
changes between averages, % of GDP 
 
0.60 
 
-3.87 
 
3.10 
 
1.37 
1996-98 / 1993-95 
changes between averages, % of GDP 
 
-8.84 
 
-4.20 
 
-3.47 
 
-1.17 
 
 
 We could generally classify the explanations for the decline in private 
investments during the whole transition period into three groups: 1) incomes policy 
combined with price and profit margins control and an appreciating real exchange 
rate; 2) structural constraints; and 3) a crowding-out mechanism. Referring to the 
first group of causes, many times during transition period the average pay in industry 
was rising faster than productivity, as encouraged by official guidelines. In contrast, 
the most advances Central-European countries were restricting the pay increases in 
correlation with the evolution of productivity. This phenomenon was reinforced after 
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the election of a socialist coalition government in 1992 that provided large increases 
in the minimum wages and made wage indexation its official policy. A similar kind 
of policy was also applied for a short period after the elections in 1996 and it has 
been resumed in 2000, after the election of a social-democratic government. 
Especially, during the first years of transition – but in certain measure up to now – 
the rather unorthodox and bureaucratic controls on prices, profit margins and house 
rents as well as an (ex-post) non-accommodating exchange rate policy caused a profit 
squeeze and a reduction in housing investment. For the second explanation, it can be 
mentioned that the removal of barriers protecting Romanian industry prior to 
Romanian’s EU preparations and entry into CEFTA exposed the Romanian economy 
to world competition, which required rapid adjustment. The scarcity of managerial 
skills and qualified personnel, the inability of most of the Romanian firms to absorb 
technological advances beneficial to the quality of their products or to the cost of 
their production, bureaucratic impediments combined with a rather erratic industrial 
policy, and a financial system biased against the provision of venture capital resulted 
in the failure of Romanian industry to adjust to the new, more competitive 
environment. In relation to the third explanation, the presence of a growing public 
sector deficit, along with the fall in private investment, is sometimes used as an 
argument in favour of the operation of a crowding out mechanism through credit 
rationing because the lending interest rates were fixed by authorities at low levels up 
until 1995 (the real rates were negative many years after 1989). Although it is not an 
easy task to support the crowding out through credit rationing argument for the 1992-
95 period, during which the private investment continued to fall, there is no doubt 
that the 1990-94 government guidelines on income policy, the rather old-fashioned 
prices and profit margin controls, along with the labour market rigidities were, on the 
whole, creating a crowding out mechanism. This view, which effectively suggests 
that it is the overall stance of the economic policy that matters, seems to be justified 
by the events in the following years, which witnessed the reversal of the 
macroeconomic policy. This was mainly measured by a more severe incomes policy, 
effectively based on a drastic reduction of the degree of wage indexation and a 
change of the exchange rate policy. Also, this was partly a result of an agreement 
with IMF signed in 1993-94, regarding macrostabilisation programme that had as 
main result a drastic diminution of the inflation rate.  
 Before we close this section, it is worth looking at the relationship between 
the external debt and the current account. The relationship between changes in the 
net external debt, the current account and net capital inflow (Dornbusch, 1987, p. 99) 
may be written as: 
 
∆ ( NFB )  =  CAD  -  ( NILTC + NISTPC )             (14) 
 
where  ∆ (NFB) is the change in net external debt, CAD is the current account 
deficit, NILTC is the net inflow of long term capital (direct and portfolio 
investment), while NISTPC is the net inflow of short-term private capital. 
The net inflow of private capital traditionally covers part of the current 
account deficit (Table 5), with the net inflow of long term capital being the dominant 
item (direct and residential investment). 
Up to 1995, the prevailing negative interest rates along with an 
underdeveloped financial market were discouraging the short-term capital inflow. 
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During periods of crisis the domestic capital was also fleeing abroad, avoiding the 
existing exchange controls in various ways. Although the data on capital flight were 
not available, the sign of the balancing item in the balance of payment accounts was 
sometimes used by the non-technical press as an indicator of such movements. The 
reversal of the macroeconomic policy in 1993-1995 and in 1997-1998 with the 
application of stabilisation programme in according with IMF standby agreement 
caused an increase in the net capital inflow (both long-term and short-term) and, 
apparently, a reversal of the capital flight. The authorities’ change of attitude toward 
foreign capital (the relevant law was modified in favour of the direct investment, 
while the implementation of a gradual deregulation of financial and product market 
started immediately) the overall stance of the economic policy and the 1998 
programme caused an increase in the private long term capital inflow. In addition, 
the increase in the real interest rates and the gradual deregulation of the financial 
markets, along with the creation of new opportunities for short-term investment, 
attracted short-term capital.  
 
 
Table 5 
Romanian Balance of Payments 
bill. $ - 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
CAB -1.80 -1.29 -1.46 -1.23 -0.52 -1.77 -2.57 -2.14 -3.01
Net inflow of private capital 0.14 -0.91 -0.50 0.37 -0.77 0.21 1.33 -1.11 2.11 
Balance item n.a. 0.14 0.40 0.15 0.94 0.46 0.36 1.10 0.38 
Balance of payment before 
official borrowing 
 
-1.83
 
-2.42
 
-3.28
 
-2.31
 
-1.67
 
-3.18 
 
-3.99 
 
-4.52 
 
-4.61
 
 
 
 
7. CAN THE PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICITS BE SUSTAINED? 
 
 As we have seen, the persistent public sector primary deficits (excluding 
income from privatisation) during 1992-98 (with a small exception in 1993) have 
caused a new record increase in the public sector debt. In addition, they have reduced 
the country’s national saving ratio to very small levels in comparison to the previous 
periods and the international standards, reduced the public sector’s net worth since 
they are due to consumption and not public investment deficits and were  crowding 
out private investment. In fact, it is national investment – private and public 
investment – that has been crowded-out by government current dissaving, as 
Appendix 4 and Table 4b show. They have failed to boost the economy, casting 
doubt on whether a small, open economy like Romania’s, suffering from structural 
impediments, can use an expansionary fiscal policy to boost output – especially 
during a period in which its trade partners are following restrictive policies. 
 Very few would now object to the view that the current fiscal situation in 
Romania is unsustainable, especially if we consider the quite recent external debt-
service burden crisis. It is so because the persistent primary deficits (generated 
indeed during some extraordinary – still, too much prolonged – circumstances of 
transition, but not, however, like during a wartime period) combined with rising real 
interest rates may, at some point in the future, crack the public’s confidence, and 
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hence create a crisis with unforeseen consequences in the government’s ability to 
generate primary surpluses to repay the existing debt (e.g. a capital flight) (Spaventa, 
1988).  
 To see what the dynamics of debt accumulation involve, we can solve 
equation (3) recursively to obtain 
 
d T  =  d 0  v  T  +  Σ (π m  –  b m ) v  T  –  m    (m = 1, 2, …, T)       (15) 
 
where: v  =  ( 1 + i* + p ) / ( 1 + q + p ), while it has been assumed, in order to 
simplify calculations, that the real effective interest rate, i*, the real growth rate, q, 
and the change in the GDP deflator, p, are constant: i*t = i*, qt = q, pt = p. Using 
equation (15) we can predict the debt to GDP ratio for some future moment T, 
making assumptions about the relevant parameters. A high real growth rate relative 
to the effective real interest rate tends to reduce the debt to GDP ratio, d, while 
persistent primary deficits net of (real) Central Bank financing tends to increase it. 
We consider it useful to simulate the evolution of the public sector debt for the next 
ten years using past parameter values that conform to the data in Table 1. The 
simulation output is presented in Table 6. 
Romania’s determination to reduce its inflation rate in order to stabilise its 
economy and achieve the conditions to be accepted at some time in the future into 
the EU, restricts its ability to increase the direct financing of the budget deficits by 
NBR (as we already analysed in this paper), and also implies that the (real) interest 
rates will have to tend to the European levels. A rather safe and helpful assumption 
to make is that the growth rate q will be equal to the average effective real interest 
rate i* on public debt, although it seems to be in contrast to the past experience. We 
can see from Table 1 that only in 1997 i* was small, 6%, which is already plausible 
for the growth rate. This assumption can be justified only when the following events 
happen: a rapid increase in marginal real interest rates on government borrowing 
with short-term new government borrowing and high real interest rates prevailing 
world-wide. It also has a theoretical appeal – it corresponds to the “golden rule of 
accumulation” of the optimum growth theory [5]. Under the assumption q = i*, 
equation (15) becomes: 
 
d T  =  d 0  +  Σ (π m  –  b m ).              (16) 
 
 If, for instance, the 1990-1998 average π-b, which was equal to 0.3%, is 
assumed to prevail during the next decade, then taking into account that d0 = d1999 = 
1, the corresponding ratio at the end of the next decade will be only 1.03. Another 
example: if the 1996 average π-b, which was equal to 1.7%, is assumed to prevail 
during the next decade, then the corresponding ratio at the end of the next decade 
will be only 1.17. That is, the debt to GDP ratio will be 17% higher than it is today. 
Similarly, the corresponding ratio, dT, for a very large T will tend to infinity. In fact, 
dT will always tend to infinity for a very large T, unless the “average” future primary 
deficit is zero. An interesting, and empirically appealing case arises when the 
primary deficit is positive but declining. It can be shown (using the so-called 
d’Alambert’s theorem on the convergence of infinite series) that dT will converge to 
an infinite limit for a very large T, if the primary deficit, π-b, is declining at a 
constant rate. If  q> i*, it can be shown from equation (15) that dT will always be 
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bounded, provided that the primary deficits remain bounded. In the special case 
where the primary deficit, π-b, is constant, dT will converge to  (π-b) / (1-v) for a 
very large T. It should be noted, however, that this limit will be a very large one (and 
may not be practically sustained). For instance, if  π-b remains at the 1996 level, for 
reasonable values of q and i* (7.1% for q, as it was in 1996, and 6.0% for i*, as it 
was in 1997),  dT will be closed to 4.00, which is a very high debt to GDP ratio – 
either by historical or by international standards. Finally, if q < i* the debt to GDP 
ratio increases without limit [6].  
 
 
Table 6 
The Simulation of Debt Evolution for Ten Years 
 
Time horizon 
( d 0 = 100 ) 
The value of parameters  
as in the year*): 
 
Value of 
indicator v**) 
5 years 10 years 
1995  1.204 239 585 
1996 1.317 388 1519 
1997 1.054 111 124 
1998 1.227 258 695 
  *)  See Table 1 (excluding general government proceeds from privatisation) 
**) See equation (15) 
 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main conclusions of the paper are the following: 
 1) The record increase in the public debt to GDP ratio of the transition period 
is due to a very large increase of the social consumption expenditure without a 
parallel increase in the tax revenue; 
 2) Record primary deficits occurred during the analysed election years (1992 
and 1996) indicate the presence of a political business cycle;  
 3) Real average effective interest rates on central government debt were 
negative for some years (1993 and 1994), but are increasing and then probably 
stabilising;  
 4) There were many oscillations in the evolution of the current account deficit 
relative to GDP and in the of public sector deficits, on the background of a severe 
decrease in saving and investment (both private and governmental). Many times they 
were non-correlated through the operation of various crowding-out mechanisms; 
 5) The high public sector consumption deficits should not continue. The 
country’s saving ratio is now the lowest in the European area despite a relatively 
constant household saving ratio, while a rapidly growing public debt may crack the 
public confidence and lead to capital flight; 
 6) A better correlation between some fundamental macroeconomic indicators 
and including pressures that come from the international financing institutions, as 
appears to be the trend in the recent years, will be necessary in order to ensure the 
sustainability of the public sector debt and the credibility of the Romanian economy 
for the future.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
t
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
.dtb_d% t 100
3
7.4
19
17.4
20.6
20
27.4
32.8
31.8
.dExb_d%t 100
3
7.4
16.5
16.1
18.2
17.8
23.6
27.4
25.4
.dInb_d% t 100
0
0
2.4
1.3
2.4
2.3
3.8
5.4
6.4
.dtb_L%t 100
4.6
18.3
28.4
29.2
22
25.4
35.9
36.7
39.2
.dExb_L%t 100
4.6
18.3
24.7
27.1
19.5
22.5
30.9
30.7
31.3
.dInb_L%t 100
0
0
3.7
2.1
2.5
2.9
5
6
7.9
 
 
dtb_d is gross country’s debt to GDP ratio, in USD 
dExb_d – gross external debt to GDP ratio, in USD 
dInb_d – gross internal public debt to GDP ratio, in USD 
dtb_L – gross country’s debt to GDP ratio, in Lei 
dExb_L – gross external debt to GDP ratio, in Lei 
dInb_L – gross internal public debt to GDP ratio, in Lei 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2 
 
 
The Fiscal Position of Selected Transition Countries, 1990-1998 
 
  Bulgaria Czech
Rep. 
Croatia Poland Romania Russian 
Feder. 
Slovak 
Rep. 
Slovenia Hungary 
 1990  –8.5  –0.2  ...  3.1  0.3  ...  –0.2  –0.3  0.4  
 1991  –3.8  –2.1  ...  –3.8  –1.9  –13.9  –3.8  2.6  –4.9  
Government 1992  –5.8  –0.2  ...  –6.0  –4.4  –5.5  –2.8  0.3  –6.7  
budget as 1993  –11.0  0.1  0.2  –2.8  –2.6  –9.9  –6.2  0.3  –5.6  
deficit-to-GDP 1994  –6.5  0.9  0.6  –2.7  –4.2  –11.4  –5.2  –0.2  –7.4  
% 1995  –6.6  0.5  –0.8  –2.6  –4.1  –5.5  –1.6  0.0  –2.4  
 1996  –10.9  –0.1  –0.1  –2.5  –4.9  –8.1  –4.4  0.3  –1.9  
 1997  –3.7  –1.0  –0.9  –1.3  –3.6  –7.3  –5.7  –1.1  –4.0  
 
B 
U 
D 
G 
E 
T 
 
 1998  1.3  –1.6  0.9  –2.5  –3.1  –5.0  –2.7  –0.6  –5.4  
Source: NBR data, Annual Report for 1998, p. 28. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
Consolidated General Government (IMF adjustments) 
(in percent of GDP) 
 
   
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
   half 
TOTAL REVENUE 39.8 41.9 37.4 33.9 32.1 32.1 29.9 30.6 35.0 42.3
   Current  39.5 38.9 36.6 33.6 31.9 32.0 29.8 29.4 32.6 39.4
     A. Tax 35.5 33.2 33.5 31.3 28.2 28.8 26.9 26.7 30.9 37.9
      A1. Direct tax 22.7 23.7 25.0 21.6 20.1 19.6 17.9 16.9 17.8 23.9
       Profit tax 7.1 5.1 5.3 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.3 4.3 3.3 3.9
       Tax on salaries 6.8 7.6 7.6 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.1 5.6 5.5 6.8
       Social welfare contributions  7.9 10.0 10.3 9.3 7.9 7.9 7.5 6.6 8.7 11.0
    Other 1.0 1.1 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.4 2.2
      A2. Indirect tax, 
             out of which: 
12.8 9.5 8.5 9.7 8.1 9.3 8.9 9.8 13.1 13.9
        Excises and oil tax 11.8 8.3 6.9 3.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.7 2.5 3.4
        V.A.T. 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 4.6 5.2 4.9 4.7 6.6 7.2
       Customs tax 0.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.9
        Other 0.8 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.1 2.1 2.3 1.4
     B. Nontax 4.0 5.7 3.1 2.3 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.7 1.7 1.6
   Capital 0.3 3.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.2 2.4 2.6
  Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 38.7 38.7 42.0 34.2 33.9 34.7 33.8 34.2 38.3 46.1
  Current 30.8 32.7 36.7 29.3 28.1 28.8 28.2 28.8 34.3 42.7
      Goods and services, 
      out of which: 
12.3 13.6 14.1 12.0 12.4 12.6 11.8 10.7 12.9 16.3
      Wages and salaries 7.2 7.7 7.5 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.0 4.9 5.5 7.0
      Interest payments for public debt 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.9 1.4 1.4 1.7 3.4 5.4 6.1
      Subsidies and transfers 19.8 21.6 25.9 18.1 16.3 17.4 16.5 14.1 16.0 20.4
      Subsidies 8.3 11.7 16.5 8.6 5.8 6.6 6.1 2.5 1.7 3.1
      Transfers 11.6 9.9 9.4 9.5 10.5 10.8 10.4 11.6 14.4 17.3
   Capital 7.9 6.0 4.1 4.3 5.5 5.3 5.2 4.8 3.3 3.1
   Lending minus repayments 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.3
 OVERALL BALANCE (cash net 
   of privatisation receipts) 
1.0 3.2 -4.6 -0.8 -2.5 -3.8 -5.5 -4.6 -5.6 -6.3
   OVERALL BALANCE  (cash- 
   including privatisation receipts) 
1.0 3.2 -4.6 -0.4 -1.9 -2.6 -3.8 -3.6 -3.3 -3.8
 PRIMARY Balance (including 
private) 
1.0 3.3 -4.4 0.6 -0.5 -1.2 -2.2 -0.1 2.1 2.8
 PRIMARY Balance (excluding 
private) 
1.0 3.3 -4.4 0.2 -1.2 -2.4 -3.8 -1.1 -0.2 0.2
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
Gross Savings 
 
    
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
   half
Real GDP (%) -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.9 -7.3 -3.9
Current Account Balance -8.7 -3.5 -8.0 -4.5 -1.4 -5.0 -7.3 -6.1 -7.9 -6.0
(CAS=GGFS  +  PS  –  PI)   1.03 3.25 -4.61 -0.37 -2.40 -2.92 -4.05 -3.91 
General Government Balance (GGFS) 1.0 3.2 -4.6 -0.4 -1.9 -2.6 -3.8 -3.6 -3.3 -3.8
General Government Balance   
on Current Transaction (GGFSCT) 
8.6 6.2 -0.1 4.4 3.9 3.2 1.6 0.7 -1.8 -1.9
Private sector gross saving (PS) 12.6 15.3 23.9 20.6 19.8 16.6 17.2 14.4 9.8 6.2 
(PS=NS-GGFSCT) 26.5 22.8 23.3 18.7 20.6  9.8 
National Gross Saving (NS) 
(NS=PS+GGFCT) 
21.2 21.5 23.8 24.9 23.6 19.8 18.8 15.0 8.0 4.3 
E=(Pib-Cf)/PIB 20.8 24.1 23.0 24.0 22.7 18.7 17.4 14.7 9.2 4.2 
Gross household saving ( GHS) 1.6 3.4 4.0 7.3 7.6 5.5 … … 
Private gross investment (PI) 22.3 22.1 27.3 24.7 19.3 19.0 20.6 17.0 14.4 7.7 
Gross state investment (GST) 7.9 6.0 4.1 4.3 5.5 5.3 5.2 4.8 3.3 2.6 
Gross National Investment(NI) 30.2 28.0 31.4 28.9 24.8 24.3 25.9 21.8 17.7 10.3
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
[1] In a recent paper published by STANDARD&POOR’S it was shown that various factors 
have eroded the advantages of Romania’s moderate debt burden: high political risk; policy slippage, 
and a rapid rising external debt-service burden because of continued borrowing to finance budget 
deficits and the loss-making, state-owned enterprises and banks (Standard and Poor’s, 1999). 
[2] To estimate parameters i and a in equations (1)-(3), we used the following relations: 
 
i t  =  Db t / D t - 1
 
where Db is general government interest, and respectively 
 
a t  = ( D t  / D t - 1 ) [ 1 - ( CS t - 1 / CS t ) ] 
 
CS being exchange rate (Lei/USD) at the end of the year. 
[3] Bernard Laurens and Enrique G. de la Piedra (1998) point to three possibilities to secure 
government borrowing: voluntary private sector purchases of government debt in the domestic 
market, foreign borrowing and forced placement of government debt, such as the creation of a 
“captive” market for government securities by forcing institutions to invest a certain share of their 
portfolios in such securities. 
[4] It is noteworthy that the differences between the size of this indicator after using this 
assessment method do not affect the conclusions of our analysis. Thus, consistent with calculations 
made by Nina Budina (1998), gross seignorage in Romania equalled 7.8% in 1992, 7.4% in 1993, 
9.8% in 1994, 2.9% in 1995, and 5.25% in 1996.   
[5] Approaches to the problem of debt accumulation using differential equations end up with 
an indeterminacy in the case where g = i, while the present method, starting from equation (3) and 
solving it recursively to obtain equation (15), avoids it (OECD, 1989).  
[6] This is the so-called Domar’s law. 
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